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654 HICKS v. REIE> [21 C.2d 
ing that Mrs. Larrabee was entitled to the property left to 
Kate ChaseiDstructing the trustee. to convey the disputed 
share to her; and allowing a sum. of $1,250 for attorney's fees. 
Wellman has appealed from this judgment, contending that 
the trustee could not in.aintain this action and that no' attor-
ney's fees should have ~een allowed. 
The trustee at the time this proceeding was commenced, 
was faced with conflicting demands threatening a possible 
double liability. It was entitled to judicial instructions as 
to its duties under the trust agreement. (See Security~First 
Nat. Bk. v. J. D. Millar Realty Co., 217 Cal. 277 [18 P.2d 
339].) 
[2] No error has been sho~ in the allowance of .~ttor~ 
ney's fees to the trustee. The truil court found ~hat th~ ac-
tion "was necessarily brought," and under sectIOn 2273· of 
the Civil Code a t~ustee "is'entitled to the repayment, out of 
the trust property, of all expenses actually-and properly-in-
curred by hitn. in the performance of his truSt." Appellant 
has not objected to the amount of the allowance. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J't Curtis, J., Edmonds, J'j Carter, J., Traynor,J., 
and Peters, J, pro tern., concurred. 
fL. A. No. 18523. In Bank. Feb. 26, 1943.) 
DORRANCE P.HICKS et al., Respondents,v. JOHN REIS 
. 'et aI., DefendantEl; FRED, W. GRAY, Appellant. 
[l.-Ic]· Autombbiles·,- Persons· Liable--.Le.Jlders-possessionby 
. Employee-:-Permission;-Whether an infel'en¢e·.of. pen;nission 
fora used carsalesman's driV'ing of an automobile is rebutted 
is a question of fact where, assuming theowner;s testimon1 
to the absence of permission to be uncontradicted, the trier of 
the facts in passing thereon may consider the manner in which 
he testifies, etc., and in addition thereto his interest in ·the 
result of the -case; where, aside from this,' his testimony is 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-, 7J Automobiles, § 167(4); I2J 
Automobiles, §l67(6); [4] Witnesses, § 297(1); [5] Ev!dence, 
'§ l,W;. (6] Trial, § 339. 
6~oq- 'b6 
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contradicted by that of his employee';- and wheJ:.e, inore~ver;­
it may .. -be inferred from the.· eriJ.ploY!le'8testhnon'thl!o~' the, 
employees had permission to use. the cars to perfortn.'~heir . 
duties and' that the ownei- 'impliedly consented 'to the taking 
of the car in question by the employee 8,S 1!oprospective';'pur~, 
chaser. ' 
[2]'·Id.-Pel'sons Liable-Lender-?ossession by Person. Intrn,stcd 
with Oar . .......;Under Veh. Code; § 402;th!l owne.r of ,an ftutomo.., 
bile involved in anautb~6bileac~iderit is, .Hable bi damages 
to the extent there limited if his perniittee consents to another 
driving, at least where thepermjttee' accomjnillies the drivei'. 
(3] Id.-Persons Liable-Lender-Possession· bi . Employee.":"In 
an automobile accidentca~e,if 'the evidence -l!how~ that::the 
automobile was being driven by an employee of the defendant 
employer at the time of the accident, the jury may infer that 
the employee was operating the !!.utomobile' with the' pCrixiis-
sion of the owner. '. 
[4]' Witnesses-Determination of Credibility-Disregarding 'l'esti~ 
mony.-Provided the trier of the facts .does nofact'arhitrarilf, 
,he may reject the testimony of a witness in its entiretY';eten 
though the witness is uncontradicted. lience, asa general 
rule the trier .ofth!l' facts is free ,to disbelieve tes~iniony' as to 
the 'n:one~istence of a fact in issue and to :fInd that it dOes 
exist solely on the basiso£an inference. 
[5] Evidence ...... lnferences ....... Question (if Fact.-The trier of _ the 
,facts· may notin.!Iulge in an inierencewhenthat inference is 
rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence. of 
such a nature that it is not subject to doubt in, the, minds of 
reasonable men, or when it is of such a nature that' the' minds 
of reasonable men cannot differ on the subject; ,but' if there 
is any reasonable doubt as to whether the inference, 'as' ~' 
matter of law, has been rebutted, that doubt' should be r~~ 
solved in favor of submitting the question to the tIier, of the 
~clL . , ,,' 
[6] Trial-Findings_Negative Pregriant.-Whe~e 'an :'afih.rii~tiv.' 
. defense presents a single .issue, e.g., whether;a'j~llih.iti1l' ~a:, 
guilty of contributorY ilegli;gel1(\~; a ftndiDgthat "a:U,j :tllQ';aiJ 
,legations of the defense are untrue issufflcient." ., ' ;\ '; '"" 
[7] Automobiles - Persons Liable-- Lend!lt';';'Possession,bf Em:; 
ployee--.Evidence . ..,-. Iitan automobile . accident ' case:, invol-nhg 
the question of an automobilesalesinan's-perniissionto,take~ 
the car in question and whetherempl~yees were authoriz~d: 
,'[4J Disregarding uncontradicte4t!lstiniony, hQte,8:ALlf.;:79a; 
See; also, 27 Cal.Jur. 182; 28 Bi.O.L. 660.' . . .. , 
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to t~kecars with~ut' permissi~n, testi~ony of the ~alesman 
" that .he told another. ~mployeEl of his intention to take the car, " 
although . inadmissible to show permission, is admissible. to 
BhOw the factssurrpunding the ~akingand also to .BUp})Ort the 
·employee's (lontelltionthat the employer ,ha:l no rule prohibit. 
mg the taking of cars. . 
AP~EAt from a judgment .of the Superior Court of":V en-
tura County. Louis C, Drapeau, Judge. Affirmed. . 
Action for damages for injuries. to person and propcrty 
sustnined in an autopiobile collision. Judgment against the' 
Owner of thecolIid,ing car, the driver; and an employee of 
the owner, affirmed on appeal 'of the owner. 
Jennings & Belcher,.lfrank B. Belcher arid Louis E. :Kear-
ney· for Appellant. . 
. James C.lIolluigsworth, Henderson & Churchill and E. 
Perry ,Churchill' for; RElspondents. 
,>PETERS, J. pro teDl.;-Plaintiffsj husbimdarid wife, recov-
excd judgItient against defendantS&tanl~y ReisandJohn Reis 
in the BUIll. of $6,487,andagairist defendant FredW.Gray 
mlth~ sum .qf$5,OOO, as 'damages for' hiJuries.· sustained by 
themAnacolliSionof their automobile with a car owned by 
Gray and driven' by Stanley Reis . at the request of J ohnRcis, 
an employee of Gtay .. ' Gray was held liable \lhder section 402 
6f the Vehicle Code, imposing liability on owners up to $5,000 
for the negligence of any personu~ing or operating an 'n'uto-
DidbUe with the consent, express or implied, of the own cr. 
The .. case was tried before the' court without a jury: Gray 
alone. appeais. . 
The trial court found that the Oldsmobile driven by Stan-
ley waS owned by Gray:; that John was, on J up.e 14, 1940 
(the date of the accident), employed by Gray;, that.at the time 
of the- accideritJ ohn and Stanley" did carelessly, recklessly , 
and Jiflgligently drive and operate said Oldsmobile" so a.s to 
cillJ,Seit'to~ol1ide' With respondents'car; that as apl:.o~tJ.llate 
~~ult of such. negligence the respondents suffered the dam-
ages round by the court; that at the time of theacciJeut 
"John Reis was using and operating said Oldsmobile auto-
mppile~ith . the permission of defendant Fred, W. Q:ray"; 
that Stallley Reiswas dr~ving the car •• at the request of and 
Feb~1943] HICKS 11. REIS 
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tinder theiin:mediate direction and contr'Ol of defendant John': 
Reis." [la] One of the main contenti?ns urge~ ~y appel .. , .. 
tant is that as a matter of law, the findmg that h;e grante~ 
permission 'to. John Reisto use th~ car is l.lru.IUi>p~rted ~brf ..•. 
the eVidence. On this issue theeVldence most favorable ~~. 
respondents if;l as follows : . . .. ... ,'. ..'::~" 
Appellant was a dealer in secorid-?an.d cars, Frankp~:.t:IlllD:~\ , 
was hissaleamanager, and John RelS was employed as a'sale~-::,-: . 
nian~ On: the night of June '13,1940, John, being' thenalonc' . 
on the sales lot arid admittedly then jn charge 9f t:ttelot; Jeft: 
hisoWilautomobile there, and .took:~ Oldsmobile'belongin}f . 
to appellant from the lot to his home. The ne~~ay -wasb~ 
birthday and he did not report for work. Durmgthed~~he 
drove the Oldsmobile some thirty-seven miles. On thatn,l~ht " 
Johri and his brother Stanley, arid two women,took a ,rIde .. 
in the. car, Stanley, at John's suggestion andr~quest~ drivirig., 
They drove from Los Angeles to. Oxnard, ~ dist~ce of ~ver 
sixty miles, and on the return trIp the aC~lden: WIth re~pon­
dents occurred. The question to bedetermmed is 'whether the 
trial court's finding that at that time and place John' was 
using the car with the ~onsent of appellant is 'supporte~, by 
the evidence. On this lssue respondents were com,pelled to . 
reiy on the testimony of John and of ap:pe~lant, defendants 
called under section 2055 of the Code of· CIvIl Procedure,and· 
upon .. the testimony of Burne, salesmanager 'of appellant. 
John testified that he had been working for appellant about 
. three weeks' before the accident; that he had worked for ap-
pellant on a prior occasion; that at no time during.his previ-
ous or during his. last employment had he ev~r been mstructed 
by Htime or appellant, or anyone else, not to take cars from 
the lot without' first. securing the consent of appellant or of 
Hume; that he had' never been informed of any such rule; 
that during his last employment, on several occasions, he had 
taken cars off the lot to demonstrate them to prospects; that 
he had' occasionally taken a company car from the lot an~ 
driven to lunch; that ifBume was there he told Burne where 
he was going, not to secure his permisf;lion, but so that he 
would know where he was; that if Bume or appellant were 
not there' he took the cars without telling anyone; that Burne 
knew he took the cars for these purposes j that when he had 
l~ft appellant's e:mploy on the previo~ occasioll ?e had not 
been fired by Gray for taking a car overnight WIthout per~ 
mission' that no such thing occurred; that he left his em-
" "'. . . . 
.. 
',;. 
658 HICKS V. REIS [21 C.2d 
ploy with appellant to secure more money and that appel. 
lant told him of another job and introduced him' to his 
new employer; that some~ime prior to June 13, 1940, he be· 
came interested in purchasing the Oldsmobile' for himself; 
that he discussed the purchase with appellant, and particu. 
larly discussed with him the details of the proposed purchase;' 
that he also discussed the proposed purchase with Chapman 
and Daly, two other employees of appellant; that he ran 
the motor on the lot but wanted to assure himself the car 
was in good condition; that he took the Oldsmobile for that 
purpose; that on June 14th he drove the car some thirty. 
seven miles and was satisfied with its performance; that on 
the night of June 14th when they rode to Oxnard he "would 
have liked to have had" his brother Stanley's opinion of the 
car before he purchased it; that he asked Stanley to drive. 
Much of this evidence was contradicted by appellant and 
his salesmanager, Bume. Appellant testified that when Reis 
was formerly employed by him he took a car from the lot 
and kept it overnight and was discharged for so doing; that 
when he re-employed John, about three weeks before the ac-
cident, he told him that it was a rule of the company that 
no car should' be taken from the lot without his consent, 
or the consent of Bume; that he never had any conversation 
with John about the purchase of the Oldsmobile; that he 
never knew of John taking a car to lunch and never knew 
of John taking a car off the lot for any purpose without first 
securing permission. He admitted, however, that on the night 
of June 13, 1940, John was in charge of the lot and was 
authorized to write contracts of sale. Although he testified 
that no salesman ever took a car off the lot for demonstration 
or other purposes without consent, he also testified that sales-
men were empowered to demonstrate cars "around the 
block" and that he instructed Reis that "if anyone wanted 
a demonstration to go with him." . 
Frank P. Hume, salesmanager of appellant, corroborated 
appellant in most respects. He contradicted John Reis by 
testifying that he had instructed John that cars were to be 
taken off the lot for demonstration purposes only and that 
either he or appellant must be notified if a car was taken. 
He testified that he had no knowledge of any case when a 
salesman had ever taken a car without first securing per-
mission. , 
On this evidence, can' it be said that the finding that John 
Feb. 1943] HICKS·V. REIS 
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was using the car with the permission of appellant, is t9tally . 
unsupported by the evidence as a matter of law 7' The fact 
that Stanley was actually driving the car is immaterial. The 
evidence clearly demonstrates that Jolin was using and op~ 
erating the car through the instrumentality of Stanley. Both 
John and Stanley so testified. [2] The law is well settled 
that under section 402 of the Vehicle Code the owner is 
liable to the extent there limited if his permittee consents 
to another driving, at least where the permittee accompanies 
the driver. (Sutton v. Tanger, 115 Cal.App. ~67 [1 P.2d 
521]; Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal.App.2d 349 [37 P.2d 
99] ; Armstrong v. Bengo, 17 Cal.App.2d 300 [61 P.2d 1188].) 
. The real question, therefore, is whether there is any evidence,. 
or inference from the evidence, to support the finding that 
John was using the car with the permission' of appellant at 
the time of the accident. . 
[3] The law is settled that "If the evfdenceshows that 
an automobile was being driven by an employee of the owner 
at the time of an accident, the jury may infe~ that the em-
ployee was operating the automobile with the permission of 
the owner." (Blank v. Ooffin, 20 Ca1.2d 457, 460 [126 P.2d 
868]; see, also, Bttshnell v. Y oshika Tashiro, 115 Cal.App. 
563 [~ P.2d 550]; McWhirter v. Fuller, 35 Ca1.App. 288 
[170 P. 417] ; Pozzobon v. O'Donnell, 1 Ca1.App.2d 151 [36 
P.2d ,23'6] ; Brown v. Ohevrolet Motor 00., 39 Cal.App.738 
[179 P. 697]; Wagnitz v. Bcharetg, 89 Cal..App. 511 [265 
P. 318]; Westberg v. Willde, 14 Ca1.2d 360 [94 P.2d 590].) 
Under this rule the trial judge, as the trier of the facts,was 
justified in inferring permission existed. [lb] Appellant 
contends that the inference was rebutted as a matter 
of law. Such contention is not sound. The trier of 
the facts is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses. (§ 1847, Code Civ. Proc.) While this same section, 
declares that a witness is presumed to speak the truth, it 
also declares that "This presumption, however, may be re-
pelled by the manner in which he testifies, by' the character 
of his testimony . . . or his motives, or by contradictory evi~ 
dunce." In addition, in passing on credibility, the trier o~ 
the facts is entitled to take'into consideration the interest of 
the witness in the result of the cast!. (See cases Mllected. 27 
Cal.Jur. 180, § 154.) [4] Provided the trier of the' faC'ts 
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of a witness, even though the witness is uncontrndicteli 
(Blankv. Coffin, supra; Hinkle v. Sou.thern Pacific 09., 12 
Cat2d 691 [87 P.2d 349]; Barsha v .. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
~2 Ca1.App.2d 556 [90 P;2d 371] ; B1trkc v. Bank of Amer-
~ca etc. Assn., 34 CaLApp.2d 594 [94 P.2d 58]; People v. 
!'a ]!leur,42 Ca1.App.2d 50 [108 P;2d99] ; see cases collected 
In 27 Citl.J tir. 182; § 156; 8 A.L.R. 796.). . As a general rule, 
therefore, the trier of the' facts is free to disbelieve th'e evi-
dence as to the non-e;;cistence of the fact of permission, and 
tp find that it does e~ist solely on the basis of the inference . 
. (Blank v. Coffin, supra;Bushne~l v. Yoshika'tashiro, supra; 
Day v .. Gep,eraJ Petroleum Oorp:, 32 Oal..~,pp.2d220·· [89 
r.2d718].) In. discussing the rule that the trier of the· facts 
IP-ay find. the fact ,of permission to exist based on the infer~ 
e~ce even whel:"e the evidence contrary theretp is uncontra-
dIcted, thecotirt, in. Market Street By .. Co> v; George, 116 
CaL.4Pp. 572,576 [3 P .2d 41], stated: "It has always been 
,~he rul,~ that cou~ and juries' are not bound by mere swear-
Ing no matter ?o~ ~os~tive, unless it be credible swearing. 
It may b~ar WIthIn Itself the Seeds of its own destruction 
as whe~e)t is inbe:ently improbable, or it'S destru~tiont:na.; 
be wrought fr?m WIthout, as where the person swearing- is.in 
so~e manner .Imp~ached. In either case court and jury' are 
entItled to disbelIeve the testimony if they choose, and if. 
tIrey do refuse it credence, it is of no more effect than if it had 
,not -been given .. It disappe8l'$ fr9m the ease and the infer-
ence opposed to it is no longer contradicted. " ". 
, [5] ,To these· well. settled rules there is a commOnsense 
limited exception which is aimed. at preventing the triel'o£ 
the ,facts from running· away with the case. This limited 
~xception is that the trier Of the facts. may not ind:u!ge 'in 
t~e Inference when that inference is rebutted byclear,p:oSi~ 
tIve and uncontradicted. evidence of such a nature that it is 
not subject to doubt in the mindsM reasonable 'men. The 
'. trier ~f the facts may' not believe impossibilities. When. the 
!ebuttIn~ testimony is of sU'ch a, nature that the minds of 
reasonable men cannot differ on the subject, then the tri~rof 
the~acts cannot, and should not be permitted to, indulge in 
the mference. If there is any· reasonable doubt as to whether 
the inference, asa matter of law, has been rebutted, that 
doubt sI:0uld be resolved i~ favor of SUbmitting the question 
. to the trIer of the facts. This limited excepti()n WB$. expressed 
HicKS 'I). REIS 
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as' foI1owsin Blankv. Coffin, supra, at page 461: "If thE! 
evidence 'contrary to .the existenCE! of .the fact is 'clear, ,posi-' 
ti\re, uncontradicted, and of such .a nature that it cannot, 
rationally be disbelieved, the court must inst~ct. the. jury' 
that the nonexistence of the fact 'has been estjtbUshedas. a 
matter. of law," citing Engstrom·v. Auburn Auto Sale~ Oorp,,: 
11 Ca1.2dM [77 P.2d1059]; Crouch v. Gt'lmore Oil. Oo.~, 
Ltd., 5 Ca1.2d 330 [54 P.2d709]; Maupi'n v. Solomtm, 41. 
Oal.App.323 [183 P.198]. In the same case; after poin~~, 
ing out that the jury is the sole judge of the eredibi1i:tY of' 
. the witnesses and may disbelieve an uncohtr~dictE!d witness . 
.. 
Utherids any rational ground for doing so, the'cbui-t:sta,ted 
(p. 461); '.'In most C8.'3es, therefore, thejul'y is free j;o,diS~ . 
believe the evidence as to. the 'nonexistence of th~ ~act and;'~ 
find·thaUt does exist on the basis of the inferenceY. "; .. ' .. 
, '[lc]' The instant· case clearly discloses a fi1ctua~. siWA~o~', 
where the question as to whether theinference,:w~s re.b~t~d '" 
,was' for the' trier of the facts. The rcbutting. t~tiiri6nyw.~ 
not .. llnc.ontradictcd. PracticalJy every material ,fact f;esti1i,e4 
to'bY appellant and his employee Hume on the isSue of per-. 
mission, was directly contradicted by John Reis, anQ~h()r-'dei' 
fend ant. ,Thus John contrl;\dicted their testimony that: ,4 
rwe existed·' prohibiting employees from taking car's . fr~nD,. 
the lot; that they had informed John of this rw.(l;that John 
)iad been fired on a previous occasion for taking aCi~~with~ 
'out permission; that John had nev~r t:i'keri. ~. car. ftotni4~ 
jilt without p~rinission; that John had discussed the P1lt<?liaSe 
of the car with them. The trial judge, as the trier Qftne 
faets, sa:w these witnesses. He kne,'V appellant and Hume 
,~ercfinitIieially interested hi defeating. liability. He cho~~ ~o 
believe John and to disbelieve appellant'imd lImne., ' ~l1a~ 
was his 'province. Under such circufustances he 'Y~s justified, 
;in disbelieving all the evidence prpffered by appellaht .Qnt.1J,e' 
. ~s~ue of permission. He was 111so' justified in' basing his tind-
.'irig of permission solely on the inference. . :M()reove~, tI1e' itt-
.ference was supported not only by the evidence thattheOIds-
.mobile belonged to appellant' and John was his employee, 
'but alSo by the evidence of John. From his testimony it iii 
'l;'e.asonable to infer that employees had the pel'lllission of ap-
pellant to take cars from the lot whenever it was reasonably 
necessary to perform their' duties; that. J 6hn took the Olds-, 
,~obile in order to satisfy himself before purchasing itjthat 
.1 
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appellant knew he was a prospective purchaser, and that ap-
pellant impliedly consented to the tiling. 
'[6] Appellant urges other points for a reversal. He con-
tends that the court's finding on contributory negligence on 
the part of respondents is in the form of a negative pregnant, " 
and, in effect, finds that respondents were guilty of con-
tributory negligence. In his' answer appellant pleaded on 
information and belief as ' 'a separate and affirmative an-
swer and defense" that respondents were guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. The trial court found "That all of the 
allega~ions contained in paragraph I of the separate ~d 
affirmative ariswer and defense of defendant, Fred W. Gray, 
contain,ed in the answer of defendant, Fred W. Gray, on file 
herein are not true;" By thus finding that "all" such alle-
gations were not true appellant urges that the court neces-
sarily found that some of them were true, citing such cases 
as -Austin v. Harry E. Jones, Inc., 30 Cal.App.2d 362 [86 P. 
2d 379], and Wiles v. Hammer, 66 Cal.App. 538 [226 P. 
651]. It is true that when an allegation in a pleading con-
tains a series of affirmative allegations, a finding that "all" 
of them are not true implies that some of them are true. 
Rut that is not the situation here. In this case the affirmative 
defense presented a single issue, that is, whether respondents 
were guilty of contributory negligence. No other ultimate 
fact, was presented by the defense. The finding that all of 
the allegations of the defense were untrue necessarily amounts 
to a negativing of the defense. This is fundamentally differ-
ent from the situation presented in the Austin case. There 
the court, found that "all the affirmative allegations" ina 
designated paragraph of an answer were not true, and then 
in the same finding found that a specific allegation of that 
paragraph was not true. Obviously, in finding that all the 
"affirmative" allegations were untrue, the court fell into 
the same error as where a court finds that "all materiai" 
allegations are true or untrue. The uncertainty thus created 
voi..,ds the finding. Moreover, by finding one specified alle-
gation of the paragraph was untrue, the court cast doubt 
On what it meant by "all affirmative allegations." That is 
not the situation here. In the instant case there is no doubt 
but that the trilJ-I court intended to and did find that re-
spondents were not guilty of contributory negligence. Simi-
lar findings have frequently been upheld. (Heinrich v. Hein-
rich, 2 Cal.App.479 [84 P_ 326]; Stevens v. Stevens, 215 
F~b.1943] HICKS v. REIS 
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Cal. 702 [12 P.2d 432]; Hackler v. Tubach, 129 Cal.App. . . . ~ 
680 [19 P.2d 295].) . 
, [7] Appellant also contends that the trial courterrorie-
ous:ly, over his objections, permittedJ ohn Reis, to testify as 
to a conversation had with Daly, another employee ofap-
peIlant, in which conversation Reis testified he told Daly he 
was going to take the Oldsmobile. Appellant urges that 
there was no showing that. Daly had authority to permit the 
car to be taken. Although there was no evidence of author-
ity on the part of Daly to authorize the taking, and, there-
fore, the evidence was not admissible to show' permission, it 
was admissible to show the facts surrounding the taking, and 
to show the conduct of John .Reis in taking the automobile. 
The important issue was whether employees were .authorized 
to take cars without permission. The ,fact that John told 
Daly he was taki:p.g the car was relevant .evidence to support 
his contention that there was no rule prohibiting the taking 
of cars. John's conduct in taking the car was, relevant on 
this issue. 
The judgment· appealed from is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concu~ed. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and dissenting.-I concur in 
the judgment of affirmance as I am of the opinion that the 
evidence is sufficient to justify the inference that John Reis 
was using and operating the automobile involved in the acci-
dent with the permission and consent of defendant Gray at 
the time of the accident. 
I do not, however, agree with that portion of the majority 
opinion which places reliance upon the rule announced in the 
majority opinion in the case of Blank v. Coffin~ 20 Ca1.2d 
457 [126 P.2d 868], with reference to when an inference 
may be rebutted as a matter of law, and I adhere to the 
views which I expressed in my concurring opinion in the 
case of Blank 'v. Coffin, supra, which, when applied to the 
facts of thi~ case justify the conclusion reached by the trial 
'court. 
To my mind there is no basis in reason, logic or common 
sense ,for the F.ltatement in the majority opinion that "when 
the rebutting testimony is of such a nature that the minds 
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of facts cannot, Ilnd shoulrl not be permitted to, iudlilge in 
the inference." The import of this statement JS that if the 
trial judge or the jury draws an inference from cert:iin 
proven facts notwithstanding rebutting evidence which an 
appellate court considers sufficient to rebut the inference, 
then, the trial judge and the members of the jury do not 
have reasonable minds; in other words, the inevitable effect 
of such a rule is that in every case in which IU1 appellate 
court thinks that an inference has been overcome by rebut-
ting evidence and reverses a finding of a trial judge or a 
judgment based upon the verdict of a jury, both the trial 
judge and the jury are placed in the category of persons not 
posscssing reasonable minds. Such Ii theory is not the prod-
'uct of sound reasoning and disregards the basic concept of 
the finality of determination of issues of fact by the trial 
forum..A trial judge and a jury hear the witnesses testify, 
observe their demeanor on the witness stand, scrutinize the 
exhibits, and in many cases make ocular observation of the 
subject matter of the action. They are' in a much better 
position to determine the weight and effect of an inference 
than any appellate court justice could possibly be.' If, as 
the majority opinion concedes, the trier of fact is the exclu-
sive judge as to the weight and effect of evidence, then it 
must necessarily follow that when evidence is presented fr.om, 
which the trier of fact is justified in drawing an inference, 
if he sees fit to give such inference greater weight than any 
evidence offered in rebuttal, it should not lie in the provin('e 
of an appellate court to say that because he accorded to the' 
inference greater weight than the evidence opposed to it, 
he did not possess a reasonable mind. The trial judge and 
the jury are presumed to have reasonable minds, the' ma-
jority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. If we In-
dulge in the presumption that· appellate andSllpreme Court 
justices have reasonable minds, we have It situation in every 
case where it is contended that an inference was rebutted" 
.in which therc may be reasonablc minds on both sides of 
the issue. To then apply the rule announccd in the majority 
opinion would in every case result in an afIirmance of the 
judgment based upon inferences drawn from prov(,u facts 
if it iogical course of reasouing- is pursued. In It trial by jury 
,where all twelve jurors agree upon the verdict. and the trial 
,jud~edcllies a motion for a new trial we hnye a Rituation 
where there are thirteen minds concurring iu the same con-
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elusion. Should they all determine th~ta~jIlference should' 
prevail over rebuttiug evidence, to ~e ,c,prltrary.8l1d .. three' 
justires on nn appellateeourt should arrive, at a contrary 
conclusion, we would have the anomalous:situation of thr~e, 
justices who did not hear the witness~s( testify, observe their 
demeanor on the stand or have any' personalcf:mtact . with 
the subject matter of the action declaring, thatnon~ of the 
thirteen persons constituting the trial forum possessed rea~ 
sonnble minds. The absurdity of this type of metaphysical 
leg-alism should boso apparent that no reasonable mind should, 
venture to promulgnte it much les!! announce it as a principle 
of jurisprudence. .' 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The operative fact .incumbent 
upon plaintiffs to t~stablish in this case was the ojvn:er'scon" 
sent to the use of the automobile. ThiR . fact ,must be estab.: 
lished, not with certainty or beyond a reasonable dotibt,l)ut 
as probably true. Only if the trier of facts coultireason':. 
ably conclude from the evidence that it was more probable 
that the employee wru; operating the. allto:ri:tobilewith-.tJle 
owner's consent than without it can the finding to:'that eRect 
be su~tained. Such:t conclusion may be rea,~'hed 'by w~Yc,ot 
:m inferellce, in accord with the rUle recently;' aftirmeg' jn 
the mnjority upinion in Blank v. Coffin, 20 Oa1.2d ~457, ,'460~ , 
. 461 [12G P.2d 868]-:" An inference. isa conclusion'as tOJhe 
'existence of a material fact that a jurY mayprop~rly . draw' 
from the existence, of certain priniary fnctS.'(Cal:. Cod~ ,Cl~ 
Pioe., sees. 1958, 1960, 1832; see cnscs cited . in' 10 Oa1.Ju~; 
736~738, sec. 59.) It is not always pOSsible' for.aparty to 
It l:n.vsuit to introduce' tyvidcnce directlybearing"upbn·thO' 
existence of a fact that hc is attemptilig to prove~The' ~Vi:" 
dence available to him may .!':erv(J ollIy to establiaii therotist'-
once of certn.in primary facts that are logically. co*ne~~~dW:it1i 
. the material fact. If a jury can reasonably infer from tb'eBC 
p~imary factr. that the mntcrinl fact. 'exists, the'. 'party 'has 
introducedsufficicnt evidence to' entitle hin:t toha'Ve the.jurY 
decide the iF:sue. The jury .iR not compelled to ,draw the .in:. 
ference, however, even in thc absence of eon:trary .Jlvidence 
and may refuse to do so. Whether apat1;icular 'inference 
can b,e drawn from certain evidence. is a. questiort of law; 
but whether the inference shall he: drawn, in any given: ca'se, 
'is a question of fact for 'the jury. (See cases cited ill' 10' c~t. . . . 
.' 
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Jur. 788-739, sec. 60.)" This language makes it clear that 
an inference frQm the facts proved. must be a reasonable one. 
The essence of an inference is its reasonableness, as this court 
recognized when it denied a hearing in Mmtpin Y. Solomon, 
41 Cal.App.323, 326 '1183P. 198], declaring: "When we Say 
that a certain inference is warranted by certain facts proved, ' 
~~ mean no' more than that the jury is reasonably war-
ranted in making that deduction from the facts." (See, also, 
Orouch v. Gilmore Oil 00., 5 Ca1.2d 330 [54 P.2d 709]; 
Grand Lodge of A.O.U.W. v. Miller, 8 Cal.App. 25 [96 P. 
22].) 
The majority opinion, invoking certain statements in Blank 
v. OotJi'JI-, supra, holds,that the single fact that John Reiswas 
appellant 'semployee warrants the inference that he waS ~p­
erating the automobile, with appellant's consent at the time 
Qf ,theacci4ent, and reduces the' issue to whether the infer-
ence was dispelled by the evidence. The, first question, h~w­
eve~, is whether an inference of consent can reasonably be 
drawn from all the evidence favorable' to plaintiffs; if, it 
cannot, the question whether it is dispelled never arises. 
It is my 'opinion that such alL inference cannot reasonably 
be drawn from. the single fact that the person operating the 
automobile, at the time of the accident was an employee of 
the, owner. ' The statements in Blank v. Ooffin that it can are 
too broad and, must, be readi:q the light of the many facts 
in'that case beyond the single one that the automobile was 
operated by an employee of, the owner: •• The testimony of 
Coffin and, Stuperich revealed the following facts that would 
justif~ the jury .in concluding ~hat' Coffin was driving the 
"automobile with the tacit permission of the defendant :Cof-
fin was given el::clusive possession o,f the automobile; he kept 
it in his 'own garage without charge to the company; the 
manual of instructions that he received forbade the use' of 
thc car on vacations, but did not forbid its use for personal 
matters; the company could determine that Coffin was habit-
ually using the car for his personal busi:qess by checking his 
mileage reports against his gasoline reports; Coffin was not 
discharged after discovery of his use of the car on a week-
end triI> and was allowed to resume possession of it after 
a short lay-off." It was the sum olall these facts that led 
the court to hold that the iIiference of the owner's consent 
was a reasonable one. When, however, the fact stands alone 
• 
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~at th,e car' was operated by ,an emplo1ee .Qf ,the'owiie~: - ,.' 
.there is no more reason toinfe~ the owner's -conSeIit troni,the: ' 
7mployer-employee relationshi~~ari there' 'woti~.d qe,.!~'fut~r 
1t froID. any' one, of countless soc1al Qr busine~ i~~la:tlOtJ.!iliips 
that could exist between th(l operat,oz> ot a car andltsoWIiel'~ 
It does not follow that becaUsilan-employel' owns&: c~r'h~ 
consents to its use by an em:ploYEle,or ',thlita' ca~ 'tltkeh'pyan 
employee from his place of employ-mentIs taken'Withthe. 
owner's consent any more than if it were taken from the 
street. ' 
N osuch inference can be draWn in the presep.t. case 'fronl 
the evidence most favorable to respondents. Johrl ReiswaS 
in charge of the lot the night he took the car. ' lIe had hia 
oWn car with him and had not requested. permission totllke 
a company car from the lot. He took the cat without· the 
knowledgeof appellant or HUzPe, th~ manager of the lot. 
He kept %t oyerliight, but did not report for work the next 
day, whichwa.s his birthday. On a previous occitSl.on he :had 
,taken a car out overnight and returned it the follOWIng inor,n-
iIlg after covering a distance of 14 miles. He had occasion-
ally taken cars from the lot for demonstration to customers 
and for' transportation to lunch a few blocks' away, H~wa.s 
interested in purchasing the automobile. and.hadtalked with 
appellant about it, but was finllnciallyunableto make ~uch 
aplirchase. He had five years' el::perience iIi selling 'used 
.car!! and was familiar with motors. He had. run the motor 
while it was standing on the lot and on the llightof June 
13th drove it six or seven miles to ;his home. He was not 
satisfied with it then but by the time he had. driven it the 
. nel::t day for about 37 miles. he, was satisfied with ita per-
formance. That. night he 'and his brother Stanley' and,two 
wOmen took a ride in the car. The purpo$e of this triP, was 
"mainly social." John Reis wanted his,brother's opinion 
of the car. and asked him to d.rive. John RelS t~olight they 
would go on to Santa Barbara but they turned:'back at Ol::-
nard, about 60miies out of Los Angeles,' becailsil'6f'thecltilly 
wel1ther.,JohnReis sat in the rumble seat part of· the time 
with one dfthe women and the rest olthe timealQll~. . 
~ trier6ffacts might reasonably infer froDl this evidence 
that John Reis had appellant's permission to-:tlse cars on the 
lot. for demonstration and for small personal errands; aild 
to tryout the car himself in the usual manner as a prospec-
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tive customer. 'It is quite 'another matter to infer that he 
had the owner's consent. to retam the car for thirty-six hours 
or more and take his brother and two women, on a 120 mile 
pleasu!e trip. There is no evidenCe from which it can rea-
sonably be inferred, that appellant gave his consent to so 
exten&ive an appropriation of the automobile. The rule is 
well settled that the owner is not liable for injuries. caused 
by thev,ser of his' car in the' course of a use exceeding that 
for which consent was given.! (Henrietta v. Evans, lOCal. 
2d 526' [75 P.2d 1051]; Engstrom v,, Auburn Auto. ,Sales 
Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77P.2d :t059]; Di, Rebaylio v. Hern-
don, 6 CBrl.App.2d 567 [44 P.2d 58i] ; Souza v. Oorti,· (Cal. 
.App;) [129 P.2d 729].) 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 25, 
1943. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a hearing. 
Schauer, J., did not participate therein. 
"'Reporter's Note: In Souza v. Oorti the Supreme Court 
granted a hearing on November 27, 1942. 
[L. A. No. 17765. In Bank. Mar. 1, 1943.J 
PHOEBE A. MARLENEE, as Executrix, etc., Appellant, v. 
,[1] 
JAMES 'E. BROWN et al., Respondents. 
Vendor "and Purchaser-Bona Fide Purchasers-Fraud.-A 
bona fid~ purchaser is not chargeable with the fraud ~f his 
predecessors and takes a title purgedo£ fl,ny anterior frll.ud 
affecting it and free from any equities existing between the 
original parties. 
[1] See 25 Cal.Jur. 820. , , 
McK. Dig; ~ef'erences: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 367j [2] 
,Vendor andP1U'chaser, § 379; [31 Vendor andPurchiiser;'§ 384(3); 
,[4J Judgnients, § 291; [5]j>leading,§139(3); [6] Judgments,§ 292; 
.[7] Vendor arid Purchaser, §369(4)j [8, 9] Deeds, § 66(1)j [10] 
Deeds, § 183 ; [i1] Attorneys, § 35; [12J Trial,§'299(2) ; [13J Ap-
'peru and 'Error, § 1564(2). ' " ' 
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Id.-Bona Fide Purchasers-Possessionas·,Notic~.~Possession 
of land imparts to an intending purchaser onlys)lchknowledge 
as would. be gained by inquiry from one having possession. 
Id.-Bona Fide Purchasers-Evidence.---A· finding that 'pur-
chasersfroin,an attorney of aft executrix were bonafide,pur-
chasers without notice of her claim was sustained by theevi· 
dence where, although she was in possession, ,she. told the pur~ 
chasers that she was collecting rent for the attorney, and where 
it appeared from her acts and conversation that she fully 
knew of the contemplated purchase and asserted no, interest 
in the property. ' 
Judgments-Collateral Attack-Consideration Limited to' Bee-
ord.-In a collateral attack upon a judgment or an order of a 
probat.e court, the recitals In the record may not be contra: 
dicted by'evidence of facts different from those appearing upon 
its face. 
Pleading-Admissions-Failure to Deny.-Allegations in a 
complaint as to the absence of a bid at a probate sale, an offer 
of purchase, an intention to purchase or a purchase are not 
controverted by a statement in the answer of a conclusion that 
there was "an actual sale." 
[6] Judgments-Collateral Attack-Consideration Limited to Rec-
ord-Limitations.-The title of a bona fide purchaser may not 
be successfully questioned, even though he admits by pleading, 
or fails to object to the admission in evidence of, facts tending 
to show the invalidity of the judgment or order upon, which it 
is b/!-sed. ' 
[7] Vendor and Purchaser-Bona Fide Purchasers-Claimant 'Un-
der Void Deed.-The want of delivery of a deed may be as-
serted against one claiming tItle as ,a bona fide purchaser an,d 
relying on the grantee's possession of the instrUment. 
[8] Deeds-Delivery-Intent.-Whether Ii. deed has, been delivered 
is a question of intention. An intention of a grantor,.that his 
deed shall be'legally operative is sufficient ,however maDifested., 
[9] . Id.-Delivery-IIitent-Recognition of Title • ....;:Although,jtdeed , 
in the hands of the grantee may have been unacconip~ed",by' ' 
'a grantor's intention that it he legally e1Iective, his subsequent 
recognition of title in the, grantee is in itself a delivery,that is, 
an expression of intention 1:IY him thatthe,instrament, should 
effect the transfer of title. ' , " " 
[10],Id . .iEvidence-Delivery.-A finding ,of a leg~ldelive~'~f 
two deeds is supported, although it isnoi shown Who had pos-
session of the original grantor's deed after' shesigIied' it and 
[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 59. 
.. 
